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ABSTRACT 
We propose a novel multifactor encryption-authentication technique that reinforces optical security by allowing the 
simultaneous AND-verification of more than one primary image. We describe a method to obtain four-factor 
authentication. The authenticators are: two different primary images containing signatures or biometric information and 
two different white random sequences that act as key codes. So far, optical security techniques deal with a single 
primary image (an object, a signature, or a biometric signal), not combined primary images. Our method involves 
double random-phase encoding, fully phase-based encryption and a combined nonlinear JTC and a classical 4f-
correlator for simultaneous recognition and authentication of multiple images. There is no a priori constraint about the 
type of primary images to encode. Two reference images, double-phase encoded and encrypted in an ID tag (or card) are 
compared with the actual input images obtained in situ from the person whose authentication is wanted. The two key 
phase codes are known by the authentication processor. The complex-amplitude encoded image of the ID tag has a dim 
appearance that does not reveal the content of any primary reference image nor the key codes. The encoded image 
function fullfils the general requirements of invisible content, extreme difficulty in counterfeiting and real-time 
automatic verification. The possibility of introducing nonlinearities in the Fourier plane of the optical processor will be 
exploited to improve the system performance. This optical technique is attractive for high-security purposes that require 
multifactor reliable authentication. 
Keywords: Information security, optical encryption, optical recognition, Fourier optics, optical signal processing, 
nonlinear correlation 
1. INTRODUCTION
Optical security technology [1] is based on complex information processes in which the signals are hidden from human 
perception or commonly accessible conversion into visible signals (to keep them secret), they are extremely difficult to 
be reproduced with the same properties (to avoid counterfeiting), and finally, they are automatically, real-time, robustly, 
and often remotely readable by compact processors that validate authorized signatures. Optical security techniques 
involve tasks such as encoding, encryption, recognition, verification, use of biometric images, and optical keys [2-5]. A 
method to encode a primary image into a white-noise-like distribution is proposed in Ref. [2]. The method uses two 
random phase key codes on each of the input and Fourier planes and it can be implemented either optically or 
electronically in both the encryption and decryption stages. It has been applied to identify objects by optical correlation 
in a nonlinear joint-transform correlator (JTC) [6,7]. In linear (amplitude-based) encoding, the primary image, which is 
commonly assumed to be real and positive, is encoded in magnitude in the encrypted image [2]. In nonlinear (fully-
phase) encoding, a phase-only version of the primary image is encoded [8]. With amplitude-based encoding [2] the first 
mask is not needed to decode the encrypted image, whereas this mask has to be known with fully-phase encoding [8]. 
Both possibilities have been analyzed in the presence of perturbation of the encrypted image, and the results show their 
good properties regarding noise robustness [8,9]. In the presence of additive noise, and using the mean-squared-error 
metric, Ref. [8] shows that fully-phase encoding performs better than amplitude-based encoding. Note that this result is 
different from that obtained in optical correlation when additive noise affects the very primary image [10].  
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Regarding the signals, biometric images such as fingerprints, face, hand, iris, and retina are more and more considered 
in authentication mechanisms because biometrics is based on something intrinsic to a person (something the person is) 
in contrast to other schemes based on either something a person knows (e.g., a password) or has (e.g., a metal key an ID 
card) [11]. Security can be enhanced by combining different authenticators (multifactor authentication). In such a case, a 
Boolean AND operation has to be performed for each factor’s authentication result so all must be affirmative before 
final authentication is satisfied [11]. 
In this work we propose a novel multifactor encryption-authentication technique that reinforces optical security by 
allowing the simultaneous AND-verification of more than one primary image [12]. This optical technique is attractive 
for high-security purposes that require multifactor reliable authentication. We describe both the encoded information 
contained in the ID tag and the optoelectronic processor that validates an identity on a basis of multiple signal 
recognition. The multiple signals that act as authenticators can be: a number of different primary images containing 
logotypes, bar codes, alphanumerical signs, signatures or biometric information, and a number of white random 
sequences that constitute key codes. So far, optical security techniques deal with a single primary image (an object, a 
signature, or a biometric signal), not combined primary images. The proposed method involves double random-phase 
encoding, full phase-based encryption and a combined nonlinear JTC and a classical 4f-correlator [13] for simultaneous 
AND authentications of multiple images. The possibility of introducing nonlinearities in the Fourier plane of the optical 
processor will be exploited to improve the system performance. 
The method presented here is designed to obtain four-factor authentication. There is no a priori constraint about the type 
of primary images to encode. In this work, we consider a combination of two biometric signals and two random phase 
sequences acting as key codes. Two reference images, double-phase encoded and encrypted in an ID tag (or card), are 
compared with the actual input images obtained in situ from the person whose authentication is wanted. Retina images, 
which are stable, accurate, and very effective for authentication, are used as biometric signals. The two key phase codes 
are known by the databases of the authentication processor. 
2. MULTIFACTOR OPTICAL VERIFICATION 
First, we describe the principles and the mathematics of the method for a four-factor authentication. Let ? ?r x  and ? ?s x
be the reference primary images (for instance, biometric images), in one-dimensional notation for simplicity, and let 
? ?b x  and ? ?n x  be two independent random white sequences used to mask and encrypt the information in the ID tag. 
All the four, ? ?r x , ? ?s x , ? ?b x  and ? ?n x  are normalized positive functions distributed in [0,1]. These images can be 
phase-encoded to yield ? ?
r
t x , ? ?
s
t x , ? ?2bt x , ? ?2nt x  that are generically defined by ? ? ? ?? ?expft x j f x?? . The 
complex-amplitude encoded function ? ?x?  containing the multifactor authenticators is given by the equation: 
? ?12 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )r b s nx t x t x t x? ??? ? ?? , (1) 
where ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?2 2 exp exp 2r b r bt x t x t x j r x j b x? ?? ? ? , 1??  indicates inverse Fourier transform, and ?  the 
convolution operation. The encoded function can be either optically generated by using an optical hardware equivalent 
to a JTC or computed and electronically implemented using conventional techniques for computer generated holograms.  
Let ? ?p x  and ? ?q x  denote the positive and normalized input images to compare with the reference images ? ?r x  and 
? ?s x , respectively. A possible realization of the optical processor combines a nonlinear JTC and a classical 4f-
correlator [12] (Fig. 1).  
In the first step, the ID-tag ? ?x a? ?  and one phase encoded input image, for instance ? ? ? ?? ?exp
p
t x a j p x a?? ? ? ,
are displayed side-by-side a distance 2a  apart on the input plane of the nonlinear JTC illuminated by coherent light.  
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Fig. 1. Optical processor for multifactor authentication. 
In a first approach, let us assume that ? ?2bt x  and ? ?2nt x  are key phase codes known by the processor. The phase mask 
? ? ? ?? ?
2
exp 2
b
t x a j b x a?? ? ?  is placed against the screen where the input ? ?
p
t x a?  is displayed. Consequently, the 
amplitude distribution in the input plane is ? ? ? ?2p bx a t x a? ?? ? ? .
A CCD sensor placed in the Fourier plane of the JTC captures the intensity distribution ( )u?  of the joint power 
spectrum, 
2
2
( ) ( ) ( )
p b
u x a t x a? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ??? . (2) 
The development of Eq. (2) gives the classical four terms of which two are interesting because they convey the cross-
correlation signals that lead to spatially separated distributions in the output plane. These two terms are: 
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
* * * *
2 2 2 2
* *
2 2 2 2
Term 1: ( ) ( ) exp 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) exp 2 ,
Term 2: ( ) ( ) exp 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) exp 2 ,
p b r b s n p b
p b r b s n p b
x t x j au T u T u t u T u j au
x t x j au T u T u t u T u j au
? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
? ?
 (3) 
where a function in capital letter indicates the Fourier transform of the function in small letter and u  is the spatial 
frequency coordinate. 
 Terms 1 and 2 of Eqs. (3) can be modified according to a variety of nonlinear techniques [14-16] that are useful to 
adjust the discrimination capability of a recognition system and to improve noise resistance, among other properties. In 
this work, we consider nonlinear transformations of the joint power spectrum of the general form 
? ?? ? ? ? ? ? 1kkNL u u u ??? ? ? , (4) 
where ? ?0,1k ?  defines the strength of the applied nonlinearity, and it can vary from the linear case ? ?1k ?  to the phase 
extraction technique ? ?0k ?  [16] also called pure phase correlation (PPC) [14]. The resultant nonlinearity modified 
joint power spectrum (Eq. 4) is displayed on the Fourier plane of a 4f-classical correlator (Fig. 1). There, a transparency 
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with the random phase mask ? ?2nt u  is placed against the screen. The second input image ? ?q x  is phase encoded and 
displayed on the input plane of the 4f-correlator. Behind the Fourier plane, Terms 1 and 2 of Eqs. (3) are converted into: 
? ?
? ?
1 1
* * *
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1
*
2 2 2 2 4
Term 1: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) exp 2 ,
Term 2: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) exp 2 .
k k
q s s r b p b r b p b n n
k k
q s s r b p b r b p b n
T u T u T u T u T u T u T u t u t u j au
T u T u T u T u T u T u T u t u j au
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
  (5) 
If the information contained in the ID tag corresponds to a positive validation, then the AND condition ? ? ? ?r x p x?
AND ? ? ? ?s x q x?  is fulfilled. In such a case, if the phase extraction is applied ? ?0k ?  and provided the system is free 
of noise and distortions, Term 1 of Eq. (5) simplifies into ? ? ? ?exp 2
s
T u j au , which represents a wavefront with all its 
curvature cancelled [13] that focuses on a sharp multifactor autocorrelation peak centered in 2x a? ?  of the output 
plane (Fig. 1). From Eq. (5), the output intensity distribution corresponding to Term 1 is the cross-correlation of 
autocorrelation signals given by 
? ? ? ? ? ? 2* *2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 )POF s PPC r b CMF nAC t x AC t x AC T x x a?? ? ? , (6) 
where ?  denotes cross-correlation, and subindices CMF, POF, PPC indicate the sort of filter involved in the 
autocorrelation signal (CMF stands for classical matched filter, POF for phase-only filter, and PPC for pure phase 
correlation). Since autocorrelation peaks are usually sharp and narrow, particularly those for POF and PPC, we expect 
that the cross-correlation of such autocorrelation signals will be even sharper and narrower. Consequently, the 
information contained in Term 1, allows reinforced security verification by simultaneous multifactor authentication. 
On the other hand, when the condition ? ? ? ?r x p x?  AND ? ? ? ?s x q x?  is fulfilled, and the phase extraction 0k ?  is 
considered, Term 2 of Eq. (5) becomes ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?2 4/ exp 2q s nT u T u t u j au? ? ?? ? , which does not yield an interesting result 
for recognition purposes. If ? ? ? ?p x r x?  or ? ? ? ?q x s x? , Term 1 contains a cross correlation signal that is, in general, 
broader and less intense than the multifactor autocorrelation peak of Eq. (6). Furthermore, the key codes known by the 
processor, ? ?2bt x  and ? ?2nt x , play an important role in optical security as additional authenticators with the properties 
described in Refs. [1-2, 8-9]. 
In case of having a linear system ( 1k ?  in Eq. 5), only a linear replica of the joint power spectrum of Eq. (2) and, 
consequently, of Terms 1 and 2 of Eq. (3) would be introduced in the Fourier plane of the 4f-correlator. Again, if the 
information contained in the ID tag corresponds to a positive validation [i.e.,  ? ? ? ?r x p x?  AND ? ? ? ?s x q x?  is true], 
the output intensity distribution of Term 1 is the cross-correlation of autocorrelation signals given by  
? ? ? ? ? ? 2* *2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 )CMF s CMF r b CMF nAC t x AC t x AC T x x a?? ? ? ,  (7) 
that is centered in 2x a? ?  of the output plane. In comparison with the result of Eq. (6), all the autocorrelation signals 
contained in Eq. (7) are of the same type (CMF). 
Intermediate cases between the aforementioned phase extraction and the linear system can be achieved by adjusting 
parameter k  between the two extreme values [0, 1]. In such cases, the output intensity distribution corresponding to 
Term 1 (Eq. 5) will lead to the cross-correlation of multiple autocorrelation signals resulting from the intermediate 
nonlinearities. Features, such as peak intensity and sharpness, discrimination capability and noise robustness of the 
validation system can be modified by changing parameter k  according to the identification requirements [15, 17-20]. 
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3. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
The method is illustrated here with numerical simulations. We consider the biometric retina images of Fig. 2(a,b) (188 x 
188 pixels) as primary reference images: (a) ? ?s x  and (b) ? ?r x , though the signals used in the process are those of 
Figure 2(a,b) but with reverse contrast, for which veins appear more intense than the background.  
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
(e) (f) 
Fig. 2.  Retina images: (a) right eye, (b) left eye (they are used with reverse contrast in the primary reference images ? ?s x ,
? ?r x ); (c) key code ? ?b x , (d) key code ? ?n x ; (e) magnitude and (f) phase of the encoded image ? ?x?  of the ID tag. 
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The phase masks ? ?b x  and  ? ?n x  are two different random white sequences [Figure 2(c,d)]. Figures 2(e,f) show the 
magnitude and phase of the complex-amplitude encoded image ? ?x?  of Eq. (1), respectively. Their dim appearance 
does not reveal the content of any primary reference image. In the following subsections, we analyze the effects of 
applying different nonlinearities in the Fourier plane by varying parameter k  on the validation system response. 
3.1 Linear processor 
When the input images coincide with reference images ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?andr x p x s x q x? ?? ?? ?  and the key codes ? ?b x  and 
? ?n x  are properly used, that is, when all four factor’s authentication results are satisfied, the output intensity 
distributions for Terms 1 and 2 of the linear processor with 1k ?  (Eq. 5) are plotted in Figure 3. 
(a) (b)
Fig. 3.  Intensity output distribution for (a) Term 1 and (b) Term 2 of Eq. (5) corresponding to the response of a linear 
processor ( 1k ? ) when all four factors are validated. 
Figure 3(a) shows a small peak on an intense background that accounts for the cross correlation of the three CMF 
autocorrelation signals of Eq. (7). The characteristics of both the CMF filtering technique and the sort of images chosen 
as factors for validation can explain the broad output. This result is unsatisfactory because the peak does not show good 
enough properties of sharpness to be detected. Figure 3(b) shows the intensity distribution corresponding to Term 2 of 
Eq. (5) with 1k ? . In this case, the intensity level is very high, but insignificant. 
Table 1 provides a signal comparison of multifactor validation for different cases: when every signal is correct and 
when any mismatch occurs among the four signals verified by the processor. The maximum value of the output intensity 
of Term 1 given by the linear processor (Eq. 7) is analysed in a variety of wrong situations: both signals ? ?p x  and 
? ?q x  differ from ? ?r x  and ? ?s x , respectively; either the key phase code ? ?b x  or ? ?n x  is false, and both key codes 
are false simultaneously. The first case ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?andr x p x s x q x? ?? ?? ?  corresponds to the situation for which a non-
authorized person is compared with the authorized person whose information is contained in the ID tag of Figure 2. 
Note that both retina images change from one person to another. In our comparison, the retina images of the non-
authorized person are shown in Figure 4. As it can be seen in Table 1, there are some cases that reach very high values 
in their maximum correlation intensities, thus producing false alarms. These situations show that the authentication 
results provided by a linear processor are not reliable. For this reason, nonlinearities are to be taken into account in the 
following experiments. 
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Table 1. Signal comparison for multifactor validation. Maximum value of the output intensity of Term 1 in the linear 
processor ( 1k ?  in Eq. 5). The ID tag contains the information shown in Figure 2. The input images ? ?p x  and ? ?q x ,
which are  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?andq x s x p x r x? ? , are represented in Figure 4. 
q p Key b Key n Norm. peak Authorized 
s r Right Right 1.0 YES 
q?s p?r Right Right 0.76 YES (False alarm) 
s r False Right 0.05 NO 
s r Right False 0.92 YES (False alarm) 
s r False False 0.05 NO 
(a) (b) 
Fig. 4. Input images: (a) ? ?q x  and (b) ? ?p x  to compare with the primary reference images of Figure 2(a,b). Note that both 
retina images change from one person to another ( ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?andq x s x p x r x? ? ).
3.2 Nonlinear processor 
Let us now consider parameter 0k ?  in Terms 1 and 2 of Eq. (5) corresponding to a nonlinear processor based on a 
phase extraction of the joint power spectrum. When all four factor’s authentication results are satisfied, that is, 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?andr x p x s x q x? ?? ?? ?  and the key codes ? ?b x  and ? ?n x  are properly used, the output intensity distributions 
for Terms 1 and 2 are plotted in Figure 5. Now, Term 1 shows a high and sharp multifactor autocorrelation peak that 
accounts for the final authentication, whereas Term 2 shows a low non-interesting signal. 
Any mismatching between the four signals ? ?r x , ? ?s x , ? ?b x , ? ?n x  involved in the encoded image ? ?x?  and the 
second set of four signals consisting of ? ?p x , ? ?q x  and the two key codes known by the processor, leads to a decrease 
of the output correlation peak of Term 1 (Table 2). Figure 6(a) shows the output distribution corresponding to Term 1 
when another person is analyzed by the processor ( ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?andq x s x p x r x? ? , see Fig. 4). Figure 6(b) corresponds 
to the case when the person is right but false key phase codes are used. 
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(a) (b) 
Fig. 5.  Intensity output distributions corresponding to (a) Term 1 and (b) Term 2 of the nonlinear processor based on phase 
extraction ( 0k ? ). Term 1 shows a sharp peak of intensity produced by the cross-correlation of the three auto-
correlation signals (Eq. 6). 
Table 2.  Signal comparison for multifactor validation. Maximum value of the output intensity of Term 1 in the nonlinear 
processor (Eq. 5). The ID tag contains the information shown in Figure 2. The input images ? ?p x  and ? ?q x , which 
are ? ? ? ?q x s x?  and ? ? ? ?p x r x? , are represented in Figure 4. 
q p Key b Key n Norm. peak Authorized 
s r Right Right 1.0 YES 
q?s p?r Right Right 0.01 NO 
s r False Right 0.006 NO 
s r Right False 0.005 NO 
s r False False 0.005 NO 
(a) (b) 
Fig. 6.  Intensity output distributions corresponding to Term 1 of a nonlinear processor based on phase extraction ( 0k ? ).
(a) Another person, with ? ? ? ?q x s x?  and ? ? ? ?p x r x? , is analyzed; (b) the person is right but false key phase codes 
are used. 
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3.3 Intermediate nonlinearities 
We now explore the possibilities of adjusting the applied nonlinearity in order to change the validation results according 
to the requirements of a given identification task. It is well-known that nonlinearities can be introduced in order to 
control the processor performance in terms of intensity peak profile, discrimination capability, signal-to-noise ration or 
noise robustness [13-20]. 
Figure 7 shows the intensity output distributions corresponding to Term 1 for intermediate applied nonlinearities, when 
a four multifactor is satisfied ( ? ? ? ?q x s x?  and ? ? ? ?p x r x?  and the right phase key codes ? ?b x  and ? ?n x  are used). 
On the one hand, small values of parameter k , close to zero or equivalently to the phase extraction-based processor, 
provide sharper and higher output intensity peaks on low background (Fig. 7c) which allow an easier detection during 
the validation process. On the other hand, values of parameter k  close to unity, or equivalently to the linear processor, 
give slightly wider peaks on a more energetic background (Fig. 7a) that permit a greater tolerance in case of the 
presence of noise, but usually imply a decrease in the discrimination capability of the validation system. Differences 
between the output planes for intermediate nonlinearities can be clearly appreciated in Fig. 7. 
(a) (b) 
(c)
Fig. 7.  Intensity output distributions corresponding to Term 1 for a four correct multifactor validation ( ? ? ? ?q x s x? ,
? ? ? ?p x r x? , ? ?b x  and ? ?n x  are used) when intermediate nonlinearities are applied in the Fourier plane: (a) 
0.75k ? ; (b) 0.5k ?  and (c) 0.25k ? .
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The discrimination capability of the validation system is analyzed by comparing the results obtained for non-authorized 
(i.e., ? ? ? ?q x s x?  and ? ? ? ?p x r x? ) to authorized (i.e., ? ? ? ?q x s x?  and ? ? ? ?p x r x? ) people. The correct phase key 
codes are properly used in the multifactor validation process. Figure 8 plots the maximum normalized intensity peak of 
Term 1 in the output plane for a non-authorized person versus the applied nonlinearity defined by parameter k .
Numerical results are normalized by taking into account the maximum peak value for an authorized person. From Fig. 8, 
we notice that values of parameter k  below 0.5 provide small normalized maximum intensity values so that a good 
discrimination capability for the multifactor validation system is achieved. However, values of parameter k  larger than 
0.6, lead to higher normalized maximum intensity peak values that permit a greater system tolerance to variations in the 
input signals. This characteristic may allow the validation of an authorized person by using retina scans under slightly 
different conditions (lighting, aging, etc.) that may contribute to the system robustness and it will be studied further in 
the future. 
Fig. 8. Maximum normalized intensity peak value for the output of Term 1 versus the applied nonlinearity defined by 
parameter k  (Eq. 5). Another person, with ? ? ? ?q x s x?  and ? ? ? ?p x r x?  is analyzed. Both key codes are correct. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
We have proposed a method to encode multifactor authenticators in a single complex-amplitude image function that can 
be used for an ID tag. A number of other multiplexing techniques are possible including Fresnel domain encoding to 
increase the degrees of freedom of the system [21]. The encoded image fulfils the requirements of: invisible content, 
which is an extreme difficulty in counterfeiting, and real-time automatic verification.  This optical technique is attractive 
for high-security purposes that require multifactor authentication. The optical processor that performs linearly leads to 
an output correlation peak that could be insufficient in most of practical cases. It is advantageous to introduce a 
nonlinearity by extracting the phase of the joint power spectrum. This modification leads to obtain sharp peaks of 
intensity in the output plane of the system that permit the multifactor authentication. Intermediate performances can be 
achieved by adjusting parameter k  that defines the applied nonlinearity. We have presented the results obtained by 
using a combination of biometric images (retina scanning) and key codes consisting of random white sequences. In the 
studied cases for the nonlinear processor, only the AND verification of the complete set of four signals led to the 
positive validation. Otherwise, if any mismatch appeared, the result was negative and the person was rejected. 
Adjustment of the discrimination capability and intensity peak profile of the validation system can be carried out by 
choosing intermediate k  values from the linear case to the phase extraction-based processor. 
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